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CONGRESSIONAL POWER AND SOVEREIGNTY IN INDIAN AFFAIRS
Michalyn Steele*
Abstract
The doctrine of inherent tribal sovereignty—that tribes retain
aboriginal sovereign governing power over people and territory—is under
perpetual assault. Despite two centuries of precedential foundation, the
doctrine must be defended afresh with each attack. Opponents of the
doctrine of tribal sovereignty express skepticism of the doctrine,
suggesting that tribal sovereignty is a nullity because it is not unfettered.
Some pay lip service to the doctrine while undermining tribes in their
exercise of inherent sovereignty. Underlying many of these legal fights is
confusion about both the nature of tribal sovereignty and the justifications
for its continuing existence. Under current federal law, tribes are
domestic, rather than international sovereigns. Tribes retain significant
powers but are subject to the ultimate sovereignty of the United States.
The sui generis status of Indian tribes in the American legal landscape
generates important and difficult questions: which governing powers do
tribes retain and where does the power to answer that question reside in
the federal system? How are disputes about the scope of tribal authority
to be resolved?
As the debate about what powers tribes may exercise (and over
whom) continues into its third century, it is critical to reexamine the
origins of the doctrine of inherent tribal sovereignty as a settled principle
of federal law and to articulate the principles that ought to guide the
development of that principle in the future. Setting the metes and bounds
of the doctrine of tribal sovereignty in federal law and policy belongs to
the political branches.1 This Article suggests legal principles that ought to
guide the federal political branches in the exercise of the Indian Affairs
power and the trust responsibility to address the scope of tribal inherent
authority. First, this Article examines the legal roots and branches of the
doctrine of inherent tribal sovereignty, demonstrating that the doctrine
*
© 2018 Michalyn Steele. Associate Professor, Brigham Young University Law
School. I thank my colleagues at BYU Law for their insightful comments and offer special
thanks to Brigham Daniels, David Moore, D. Carolina Núñez, D. Gordon Smith, and Lisa
Grow Sun for comments on earlier drafts. Special thanks as well to Professor Kirsten Matoy
Carlson for her important work on Congress and Indian tribes and for her insightful
comments on this paper. I am also grateful to Elisse Newey for excellent research assistance.
1
This Article builds on my prior work arguing that the boundaries of inherent tribal
sovereignty ought not be resolved as judicial inquiries. Michalyn Steele, Plenary Power,
Political Questions, and Sovereignty in Indian Affairs, 63 UCLA L. REV. 666 (2016)
[hereinafter Steele, Plenary Power]; Michalyn Steele, Comparative Institutional
Competency and Sovereignty in Indian Affairs, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 759 (2014) [hereinafter
Steele, Comparative Institutional Competency].
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remains a vital principle of federal law. Second, this Article analyzes the
nature of contemporary assaults on the doctrine of inherent tribal
authority by all three branches of the federal government, states, and
private actors. Third, this Article suggests principles that ought to guide
Congress in exercising its Indian affairs power to clarify and affirm the
bounds of tribal sovereignty in federal law and in carrying out the federal
trust responsibility to tribes.
INTRODUCTION
Red Jacket, the great Seneca diplomat and leader, “illustrated the tribe’s
frustration with the insatiable encroachment of those seeking Seneca lands during a
negotiation with the Holland Land Company’s agent, Joseph Ellicott. The two were
seated on a log.”2 Every few minutes during their discussion, Red Jacket scooted
Ellicott down the log a bit and asked him to “move along” to give him room.3 Ellicott
eventually ran out of room on the log and protested that “he could move no further
‘without ending up off the log in the mud.’”4 Red Jacket replied that the Seneca “had
likewise been crowded and pushed off of their lands bit by bit and had run out of
room for further concession.”5
It is the same with the doctrine of inherent tribal sovereignty today.6 There is
evidence of a renewed impulse to diminish the sovereign powers of Indian tribes, bit
by bit.7 Opponents and skeptics of tribal sovereignty suggest that tribal sovereignty
is a nullity because it is not unfettered.8 Others oppose the doctrine as applied,
challenging each successive effort by tribes to assert authority, sometimes paying
lip service to the doctrine while undermining tribes in their particular exercises of
inherent authority.9 Others suggest that tribes are essentially membership
2
Michalyn Steele, Breaking Faith with the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine, 64 FED. LAW.
48, 49 (2017) [hereinafter Steele, Breaking Faith].
3
Id.
4
CHRISTOPHER DENSMORE, RED JACKET: IROQUOIS DIPLOMAT AND ORATOR 91
(1999).
5
See Steele, Breaking Faith, supra note 2, at 49.
6
Id.
7
See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209–10 (1978); Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 692 (1990), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), as recognized
in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
8
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. at 214–15 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also David P.
Weber, United States v. Lara—Federal Powers Couched in Terms of Sovereignty and a
Relaxation of Prior Restraints, 83 N.D. L. REV. 735, 756 (2007).
9
Most recently, the Dollar General Corporation challenged inherent tribal civil
jurisdiction over a tort based in part on the theory that tribes lack inherent authority over
nonmembers without congressional authorization affirming the power. Brief of Petitioners
for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Dolgencorp, Inc. v. The Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians,
732 F.3d 409, 411 (5th Cir. 2013) (No.2015-SU-000254-82), 2015 WL 5169095.
[hereinafter Brief of Petitioners]. Dollar General’s argument was not rooted in any infirmity
of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw’s tribal court system or the tribe’s commitment to the
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organizations lacking governing jurisdiction and powers over any except their own
members or those who expressly consent to tribal jurisdiction.10
Underlying many of these legal fights is confusion about the nature of tribal
sovereignty. Under current federal law, tribes are not international or Westphalian
sovereigns, with the power to exercise traditional external sovereignty. Rather, tribes
are domestic sovereigns, retaining significant powers but subject to the ultimate
sovereignty of the United States.11 This sui generis status of tribes in the American
legal landscape generates important and difficult questions about the federal
separation of powers doctrine and the exercise of the Indian Affairs power. Which
sovereign powers do tribes retain? Where does the power to address that question
reside in the federal system?
This Article engages those questions and seeks to further the conversation
identifying those principles that ought to guide the exercise of the so-called Indian
Affairs power of Congress. To the extent there is a federal power to set the metes
and bounds of tribal sovereignty in federal law, the power resides in Congress and
is a concomitant of the trust responsibility.12 A primary concern animating this
Article is that despite the ostensibly settled nature of the legal status of tribes as
rule of law. Rather, Dollar General contended that tribes generally lack civil authority over
nonmembers within tribal territory. Id. Dollar General asserted that tribal courts per se
present an unfair risk to nonmember litigants. The thrust of Dollar General’s argument was
that tribes are incompetent sovereigns, not to be trusted with the exercise of sovereign powers
over non-Indians. Id. At its root, the Dollar General argument is the latest in the longstanding
debate over whether the United States ought to trust tribes to exercise the powers of
governance over people and territories, or whether tribes are more like voluntary membership
organizations, with basic powers of association, but without sovereign powers of governance
over any except their own members.
10
See, e.g., Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views
of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court’s Changing Vision, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1,
86–89 (1993).
11
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
12
Courts are ill-suited to the inquiry and ought to defer to the political branches to
resolve these questions. See generally Steele, Plenary Power, supra note 1 (arguing that
judicial inquiry into inherent tribal powers has not produced core principles from which
courts might reason to define a tribe’s retained authority and that courts should presume
retained inherent authority unless Congress explicitly divests a tribe of that authority); Steele,
Comparative Institutional Competency, supra note 1 (examining indicia of comparative
institutional competency and concluding that Congress has superior competence to
determine inherent tribal authority questions). Courts impermissibly aggrandized the judicial
role by divesting tribes of inherent authority without input of the political branches in the
modern era. Id. at 768. Examining the comparative institutional competencies of the judicial
and legislative branches shows that the legislature, rather than the judiciary, is the branch
best suited by institutional competencies to address questions of inherent tribal sovereignty
in federal law within the tripartite federal system. See id. at 779–816. Also, plenary power
and political question doctrines embraced in federal law ought to disable federal courts from
intruding on the legislature’s Indian Affairs power. These doctrines provide additional
support for the contention that courts should defer to the political branches on such questions.
See Steele, Plenary Power, supra note 1, at 709.
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sovereigns in federal law, tribes are perpetually defending against as-applied
assaults on the basic premise of their legitimacy as governments with sovereign
powers over people and territory. The assaults on the doctrine of tribal sovereignty
are most publicly launched in the courts, but they occur in legislatures as well.13
This Article argues in favor of the continuing essential sovereign character of
Indian tribes in federal Indian law to rebut the notion that tribes are more like
voluntary membership organizations than governments.14 This Article also outlines
specific sovereign powers that ought to comprise the foundational floor—or the
inviolable core—of inherent tribal sovereignty in federal Indian law. Finally, this
Article suggests normative principles that ought to guide Congress in the exercise
of the Indian Affairs power and the congressional trust responsibility to recognize
and affirm inherent tribal powers. This Article builds on the arguments that to the
extent there is an Indian Affairs power of the United States—a power deemed to be
plenary in its scope––that power resides primarily in Congress as the most
competent and politically accountable branch.15 As a result, the actions of Congress
and of the political branches should reflect sound policy judgments and clarify tribal
authority.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I examines the roots and branches of the
doctrine of inherent tribal sovereignty as a principle of federal law. These legal roots
and branches demonstrate that the doctrine of inherent tribal sovereignty, and the sui
generis nature of tribes as domestic sovereigns within the United States, remains a
vital principle of federal law. This Part demonstrates that longstanding precedent
puts tribal sovereignty skeptics on shaky legal ground when they argue for a total
departure from centuries of settled precedent to undermine tribal sovereignty. This
Part also demonstrates that the doctrine of inherent tribal sovereignty in federal law
is well-founded. Part II examines some specific ways in which the tribal sovereignty
doctrine is under siege in courts, in Congress, by the executive branch, and in the
states. Part III identifies the federal law mechanisms for affirming inherent tribal
power and suggests the core, sovereign powers of tribes that Congress ought to
provide with statutory recognition establishing a floor of meaningful tribal
sovereignty. Part IV sets forth a normative argument outlining principles that ought
to guide Congress in the exercise of its broad Indian Affairs power to recognize and
affirm the bounds of inherent tribal sovereignty in federal law and in carrying out its
trust responsibility to tribes. Such a legislative fix—a proposed Tribal Sovereignty
Affirmation Act—would not only help resolve the legal ambiguity which pervades
this area of law, but would also properly remove the issue from attempts by the
judiciary to wrest control of the federal-tribal relationship from Congress. Congress
has arguably abdicated its responsibilities under the Indian Affairs power in failing
to act to clarify inherent tribal authority. Part V concludes.
13

See, e.g., S. 1948, 115th Cong., 163 CONG. REC. 6359 (2017).
See, e.g., Dussias, supra note 10, at 94. The view of tribes as membership
organizations is admittedly a minority view. Still, tribal litigants ought to anticipate such
arguments and prepare to address them in future litigation.
15
See, e.g., Steele, Plenary Power, supra note 1, at 702.
14
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I. THE ROOTS AND BRANCHES OF TRIBAL AUTHORITY
As illustrated in the anecdote about Red Jacket’s object lesson diplomacy, the
Seneca Nation, like at least 567 federally recognized tribal nations,16 and others yet
unrecognized, survived the persistent and perpetual assaults on their land, culture,
language, and sovereignty. Though its territories have been diminished, Seneca
identity endures; and to a great extent, Seneca sovereignty endures.17 Similarly, for
so many tribes, though territories and jurisdiction have been assaulted and in some
cases diminished, tribal sovereignty endures. This Part examines just what is meant
by “inherent tribal sovereignty,” how the doctrine originated and has evolved in
federal law, and how that concept might be illuminated by the concept of domestic
sovereignty borrowed from international relations.
The United States has approached tribal sovereignty through an inconsistent
and opportunistic lens. It is a complex and curious legacy. The United States has at
times recognized tribes as sovereign entities capable of entering treaties, conveying
great tracts of territory, and governing people within their borders.18 At other times,
the United States has seemed to deem the sovereignty of tribes as having exhausted
its utility.19 The United States has sought the termination of tribes as legal and
cultural entities and sought to quash tribal identity through forced assimilation.20 The
United States has struggled between the impulse to crush tribes and tribalism as
enemies of progress and manifest destiny, and the impulse to recognize tribes as
governing partners.21 The United States has both sought to acquire tribal lands
through fraudulent and coercive treaties and has sought to protect tribal interests in
land as a trustee.22 The United States has wrestled with how to regard and reconcile
coexisting sovereigns within the territory of the United States. The Removal Act
purported to induce tribal cooperation to relocate west of the Mississippi River but
resulted in the forcible removal and relocation of tribal communities.23 The General
Allotment Act,24 sanctioned a policy of forced assimilation and effected a
catastrophic loss of Indian homelands and territory. The Indian Reorganization
Act,25 proposing a policy of greater self-government was soon followed by the
Termination Era, undertaking to terminate the federal-tribal relationship with
16

About Us, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR INDIAN AFF., https://www.bia.gov/about-us
[https://perma.cc/GN4U-63TQ] (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
17
Robert B. Porter, The Jurisdictional Relationship Between the Iroquois and New York
State: An Analysis of 25 U.S.C. § 232, 223, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 497, 507–08 (1990).
18
See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 1–2 (1831).
19
See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
20
Id.; see also Indian General Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C. § 331 et seq.
21
See, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85
NEB. L. REV. 121, 135–37 (2006) [hereinafter Fletcher, The Supreme Court].
22
See, e.g., id. at 135–39, 151–52.
23
Act of May 18, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830).
24
Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 288 (repealed 2000).
25
Act of June 18, 1934, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 5101–5129 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 11551).
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numerous tribes. Currently, the United States endorses a policy of tribal selfdetermination, recognizing tribal sovereignty and the right of tribal self-government.
In an 1803 letter from President Thomas Jefferson to William Henry Harrison,
governor of the Indiana territory, Jefferson wrote of the precarious position of the
Indian tribes in relation to the United States, and of the dilemma he saw presented
by the presence of the tribes to the United States: “we presume that our strength
[and] their weakness is now so visible that they must see we have only to shut our
hand to crush them” and that “motives of pure humanity” were behind the continuing
sufferance of tribal existence.26 Given the oscillating American impulses in the
history of federal Indian policy, with policies designed to “pulverize[] . . . the tribal
mass”27 and policies designed to encourage tribal self-determination, it is something
of a legal and historical wonder that the United States continues a government-togovernment relationship with 567 federally recognized Indian tribes into the twentyfirst century. One clear lesson of the history of tribes in the United States is the
resilient and determined nature of tribal identity and cohesion in the face of these
assaults. The tribes are not going anywhere. Instead, many tribal members and their
leaders operate on the principle articulated in the Iroquois Constitution, as well as in
other indigenous traditions: that each generation, especially its leaders, is
responsible for the consequences of their actions and choices on future generations.28
The recent fight on behalf of tribal resources and rights symbolized by the fight
against the Dakota Access Pipeline exemplifies the resilience—even resurgence—
of tribal identity within the American polity. Rooted in this long history of resilience,
tribes look to the future.
Because the bedrock principle of tribal sovereignty is under perpetual assault,
it is worth examining the roots and branches of the doctrine to understand the history
and scope of the doctrine. The doctrine of tribal sovereignty in federal law “posits a
legal pluralism that recognizes tribes as subordinate in certain ways to the . . . United
States, but self-governing to a large extent.”29 Throughout the history of the United
States and continuing to the present day, there have been questions as to the
parameters of inherent tribal powers and how such questions should be resolved.
Ideally, the political branches should work in concert with tribes as these questions
arise and the courts should defer to those arrangements.
The doctrine of tribal sovereignty is best understood as encompassing domestic
sovereignty, or in other words, a continuum of sovereign powers of self-government.
26

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Henry Harrison (Feb. 27, 1803), Founders
Online, NAT. ARCHIVES, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-39-02-0500
[https://perma.cc/G9RQ-3ZQM] (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
27
DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 216
(7th ed. 2017) (“President Theodore Roosevelt once aptly described the General Allotment
Act as ‘a mighty pulverizing engine to break up the tribal mass.’”).
28
See, e.g., Gerald Murphy, Const. of the Iroquois Nations: The Great Binding Law,
Gayanashagowa, MODERN HISTORY SOURCEBOOK: THE CONST. OF THE IROQUOIS
CONFEDERACY (Fordham Univ.), https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/iroquois.asp
[https://perma.cc/6V2H-9GY5].
29
See Steele, Breaking Faith, supra note 2, at 50.
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In federal law, tribes do not have all the “external” powers of an international
sovereign, but they retain significant inherent powers that have never been
extinguished.30 A diminished sovereignty is not an extinguished sovereignty.31 And
limited sovereignty does not render tribal sovereignty itself a nullity.32
The term domestic sovereignty refers to “the organization of authority within a
given state and its effectiveness.”33 Tribes can exercise domestic sovereignty
without posing any threat to the international or Westphalian sovereignty of the
United States.34 As Professor Krasner wrote, “[p]olities can be organized in many
different ways without raising any issues for either international legal or
Westphalian sovereignty.”35
In his treatise Sovereignty, Robert Jackson describes the “power, authority,
[and] responsibility” aspects of sovereignty in ways that may illuminate the
discussion of the doctrine of tribal sovereignty.36 Although Jackson is working to
define international sovereigns, these principles may be similarly instructive in
understanding domestic sovereigns. “Power and authority are closely related ideas,”
he writes.37 “Authority commands, power executes.”38 Professor Jackson asserts that
“[a]uthority is categorical: either/or, yes or no, green light or red light.”39 Authority
is distinguishable under this formulation from power in that “[p]ower is not
categorical; it is relative, a matter of degree, of more or less.”40 In this sense,
authority is like an on-off switch and power is like a dimmer switch.
The sovereign authority, or right to govern asserted by tribes, is acknowledged
under federal law to be aboriginal.41 That means it does not derive from the
30

Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014).
See Steele, Breaking Faith, supra note 2, at 50.
32
Stephen D. Krasner, Pervasive Not Perverse: Semi-Sovereigns as the Global Norm,
30 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 651, 652 (1997) (“[I]n some sense, almost all of the states of the
world have been semi-sovereigns. Rarely have states enjoyed full autonomy. Any member
state of the European Union is now a semi-sovereign, for the decisions of a supra-national
judicial body, the European Court of Justice, have supremacy and direct effect.”) [hereinafter
Krasner, Pervasive Not Perverse].
33
Stephen D. Krasner, Problematic Sovereignty, in PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY:
CONTESTED RULES AND POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES 1, 7 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 2001)
[hereinafter Krasner, Problematic Sovereignty]. Professor Krasner’s discussion of
sovereignty points to four common usages of the term sovereignty: domestic sovereignty
(public authority within a state and power to exert effective control), interdependence
sovereignty (control of cross-border movements), international legal sovereignty (legal
recognition of nation-states), and Westphalian sovereignty (power to exclude external actors
from the polity’s affairs). Id. at 5–7.
34
Id. at 7.
35
STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 11 (1999).
36
ROBERT JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY: THE EVOLUTION OF AN IDEA 14–19 (2007).
37
Id. at 14.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 15
40
Id.
41
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
31
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Constitution, is not necessarily constrained by the Constitution, and predates the
Constitution.42 Although tribal sovereignty is enshrined as principle of federal law,
tribal sovereignty is not a delegation of federal authority.43 Rather, federal law
recognizes the aboriginal authority of tribes to self-government.44 Using Professor
Jackson’s yes-or-no formulation, tribal authority exists.45 If one conceives of
authority as either a green light or a red light, tribal authority is a green light,
meaning it exists and has not been extinguished.46 The people of the tribes recognize
the governing authority of the tribes, and the United States has recognized the
continuing vitality of that authority.47 But as discussed below, the powers of tribes,
the “capability and capacity”48 of tribes to exercise or execute its authority is relative.
As Krasner might put it in the international law context, tribes have authority but not
control in some areas.49
The status of tribes as sovereigns possessed of governing power over people
and territory is endorsed in the Constitution, treaties, statutes, executive orders, and
Supreme Court decisions. To suggest the doctrine of tribal sovereignty is now a
nullity requires the abandonment not only of centuries of precedent claiming respect
under the principles of stare decisis, but of other fundamental principles of the rule
of law, under which the United States asserts authority and holds resources.
The doctrine is not without its skeptics. In the 2004 case of United States v.
Lara, Justice Thomas cited Black’s Law Dictionary in a concurring opinion
upholding Congress’ recognition of inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians.50 He argued that, unlike tribes, sovereigns are those entities vested with
“independent and supreme authority” and that tribal sovereignty may therefore be
“a nullity.”51 As a result, Justice Thomas looked askance at the tribal sovereignty
doctrine, arguing “the tribes either are or are not separate sovereigns, and our federal
Indian law cases untenably hold both positions simultaneously.”52 Through this
limited lens, sovereignty is an all-or-nothing proposition.
The doctrine of tribal sovereignty in federal Indian law, however, draws upon
a different conception of sovereignty than the narrow definition offered by Black’s
Law Dictionary and partakes more of the conception of sovereignty described by
Krasner. Justice Thomas used the narrow dictionary definition to illustrate what he
saw as inconsistencies in the premises of federal Indian law. However, tribal
sovereignty is not the all-or-nothing on-off switch described by Justice Thomas;
rather, tribal sovereignty in federal Indian law is more like a dimmer switch
42

Id.
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
44
Id.
45
That is not to say that tribes have the international sovereignty that Jackson discusses.
46
See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56.
47
Id.
48
JACKSON, supra note 36, at 15.
49
See Krasner, Problematic Sovereignty, supra note 33, at 7.
50
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 218 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
51
Id. at 215, 218; see also Weber, supra note 8, at 756.
52
Lara, 541 U.S. at 215.
43
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involving a spectrum of powers. This imperfect metaphor begs the question of who
then moves the switch up or down, setting the “metes and bounds” of tribal
sovereignty. That is the essential question to which this series of articles responds.
The courts are most decidedly the wrong branch to perform this function.53 To the
extent the United States adjusts the metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty, it is the
politically accountable legislative branch that ought to make those determinations in
the exercise of its Indian affairs power.54
Some powers of sovereignty have been extinguished by the United States
through treaties, legislation, or judicial fiat, while some powers remain.55 The
difficulty for tribes, courts, states, litigants, and policymakers is figuring out which
powers endure and which have been extinguished. The United States does not
recognize tribes as independent sovereigns in the sense of international nation-states,
possessed of the characteristics of external sovereignty. Rather, under federal law,
tribal sovereignty is an aboriginal power of self-governance, i.e., governance over
both people and territory, though subject to the sovereignty of the United States.56
The boundaries of tribal sovereignty are subject to revision by the dominant
sovereign of the federal government.57 Lara implicitly affirmed this “dimmer
switch” conception of tribal sovereignty. Lara also affirmed that Congress has the
power to set the policy recognizing inherent tribal powers within federal law, even
where the Supreme Court had acted to diminish tribal power.58
Despite the asserted power of Congress to guide federal law and policy in
inherent tribal authority, tribes do not exercise the powers of self-government
pursuant to a delegation from the United States.59 Rather, the United States
recognizes and affirms, in law and policy, the inherent governing authority of tribes
as stemming from an aboriginal sovereignty that has never been extinguished.60
The issue of what we mean by tribal sovereignty is not one of mere semantics.
There are serious consequences for how we define, conceptualize, and justify tribal
sovereignty. Those consequences flow to the federal-tribal relationship, for tribal
governments seeking to exercise governmental authority, and for individuals, both
Indian and non-Indian, who come within the governing reach of tribes. The
consequences are legal and moral; domestic and international. The will of the United
States to respect tribal sovereignty and principles of self-determination is amplified
in law and policy around the world in other nations’ treatment of indigenous
53
See generally Steele, Comparative Institutional Competency, supra note 1
(examining indicia of comparative institutional competency and concluding that Congress,
rather than the courts, has superior competence to determine the metes and bounds of tribal
sovereignty).
54
Id. at 800–04.
55
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,
435 (1989).
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004).
59
Id. at 198.
60
See, e.g., Brendale, 492 U.S. at 435.
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peoples.61 Respect for the rights of indigenous peoples is increasingly regarded as a
critical measure of respect for human rights.62
Tribal sovereignty is not a doctrine of federal law developed by tribes as a
challenge to the sovereignty of the United States that must be quelled.63 Nor has the
doctrine been imposed upon the United States against its laws and will.64 Rather, the
recognition of tribal sovereignty by the United States is a product of the rule of law,
by which the United States has claimed its power over the peoples and the territories
of the nation.65 As the European powers did before them, the United States
recognized the Indian tribes to be political sovereigns with whom they could
negotiate treaties.66 In fact, they needed it to be so. As a matter of law and necessity,
the tribes were recognized as capable of conveying title and negotiating peace, as
well as governing people and territory.67
Having reaped the benefit and attendant wealth of this legal framework
embraced by the United States for its own ends and in its own interests, the United
States should not abandon the principle when tribes assert the rights of sovereignty
and self-government that have been critical elements of the legal relationship until
now.68
The doctrine of tribal sovereignty as a principle of federal law finds its roots
deep in the legal soil predating America’s founding.69 “From the first European
contacts with the indigenous people of North America,” a tension existed “between
the inclination to see the indigenous inhabitants as less-than-human savages and the
need for competent, even sovereign, partners with whom land cession and peace
61

See, e.g., Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2], 175 CLR 1, at ¶ 75 (1992) (Austrl.) (High
Court of Australia relying on the juristic foundations of native title in the United States and
Canada to assert that tribal title is not extinguished without clearly expressed legislative
intent; citing Lipan Apache Tribe v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 487 (1967) and United States
v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, 314 U.S. 339 (1941)); Te Weehi v. Reg’l Fisheries Officer,
[1986] 1 NZLR 680 (NZHC) at 691 (N.Z.) (High Court of New Zealand citing Lipan to
assert that customary native rights may only be extinguished through specific legislation
clearly abrogating that right); Simon v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387, para. 38 (Can.)
(Canadian Supreme Court citing Santa Fe Pacific in finding that the extinguishment of
treaties should not be “lightly implied”).
62
See G.A. Res. 61/295, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, at pmbl. (Sept.
13, 2007), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/471355a82.html [https://perma.cc/
3CLW-9ZDU]; G.A. Res. 15/73 (Jul. 19, 2010) at ¶¶ 18, 30, 36, 40–41, 64, 83–86; U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/9/9 (Aug. 11, 2008).
63
See Steele, Breaking Faith, supra note 2, at 50.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
See, e.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 567–68 (1823).
67
Id.; see also Steele, Breaking Faith, supra note 2, at 50.
68
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treaties could be negotiated.”70 Early legal theorists on the subject found justification
for forceful conquest and colonization in the racist natural law principle that “the
West’s religion, civilization, and knowledge are superior to the religions,
civilizations, and knowledge of non-Western peoples.”71 The insatiable appetite of
the colonizers for land and resources found in the doctrine of discovery a legal fig
leaf for treating the tribal inhabitants as both inconvenient impediments to boundless
greed and convenient treaty partners.72 As preeminent legal historian Professor
Robert Williams has observed, “law . . . [was] the West’s most vital and effective
instrument of empire during its genocidal conquest and colonization of the nonWestern peoples of the New World, the American Indians.”73
The “doctrine of discovery,” rooted in European notions of “natural law and
papal edicts, provided the organizing legal principle for the European powers to lay
claim to lands and resources in the New World, including the exclusive right to deal
with its inhabitants.”74 The British availed themselves of this doctrine to treat with
the Indian tribes in forming military alliances, negotiating peace, and extinguishing
aboriginal title to lands in North America.75 In Johnson v. M’Intosh, Chief Justice
Marshall was presented with the question of whether the United States would invoke
the doctrine of discovery as security for the rights and interests in lands formerly
held by the British.76 To answer the inquiry, Marshall embraced the foundation of
the doctrine of discovery, notwithstanding how “extravagant the pretension of
converting the discovery of an inhabited country into conquest may appear.”77
While the rights of Indians to use and occupancy of the lands were purported
to be legally protected by the doctrine of discovery, the nations of Europe “asserted
the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a
consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in
possession of the natives.”78 In completing his embrace of the doctrine, Marshall did
admit a legally cognizable interest of the native peoples in the land and in their own
self-government, finding “a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of [land],
and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete
70
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sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished.”79 Even in
Marshall’s view of tribes as diminished sovereigns, he noted that some core of
sovereignty, specifically, the right of self-government, remained in the tribes even
after the United States embraced the doctrine of discovery and the narrative of
conquest.80
The United States, however, is not bound to perpetuate the moral extravagance
of the doctrine of discovery in setting the current boundaries of federal Indian policy.
It may not be within the will or capacity of the United States to return tribes to their
original homelands, but it is within the power of the United States—and indeed, the
trust responsibility may demand—to protect tribes in exercising the right of selfgovernment.81 While courts have not been consistent in supporting such rights,
Congress can exercise its authority to clarify federal law to more meaningfully
facilitate tribal self-governance.
Part of what animates the current effort to erode or to undermine tribal
sovereignty may be an alternate vision of tribes as essentially private, voluntary
organizations rather than sovereign, governmental organizations.82 As Professor
Philip P. Frickey argued, the analogy of tribes to private membership organizations,
as the Supreme Court attempted to do in Duro v. Reina,83 cannot withstand
scrutiny.84 For one thing, tribes have long since been recognized as possessing
criminal jurisdiction to try, punish, and incarcerate tribal members.85 As Professor
Frickey observed, “it is completely unclear why a tribe—if analogized to a private
association rather than a sovereign—is allowed to incarcerate a member . . . .” much
less a nonmember.86
The notion of tribes as private, voluntary organizations flies in the face of
Supreme Court precedent holding that tribes are sovereign in character. In United
States v. Mazurie,87 the Supreme Court rejected the characterization of tribes as
essentially voluntary organizations.88 The Court examined whether Congress could
delegate authority to tribes to regulate the distribution of alcoholic beverages,
including to non-Indians, in Indian country.89 Below, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that
Congress could not delegate this power over non-Indians to the tribe, which it
characterized as “an association of citizens” exercising “governmental authority or
79
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sovereignty over other citizens who do not belong . . . [to] the tribal organization.”90
The tribes, the Tenth Circuit decided, were “in no way comparable to a city, county,
or special district under state laws[,]” and had only the authority “as landowners[]
over individuals who are excluded as members.”91 The Tenth Circuit therefore
invalidated the congressional delegation of authority to the tribe at issue because
“Congress cannot delegate its authority to a private, voluntary organization.”92
However, the Supreme Court rejected the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning. The Court
held that “Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty
over both their members and their territory,” and are “a good deal more than [the]
‘private, voluntary organizations’” the Tenth Circuit had found them to be.93
Mazurie is still good law, although the principle receives more glancing citation than
effective embrace in some quarters. But to abandon or upend the core principle of
inherent tribal sovereignty would require a dramatic departure from precedent. Still,
Congress ought to codify and reaffirm in positive law that the powers of tribes are
much more—in theory and in fact—than the powers of private association inherent
to voluntary membership organizations.
From the beginning of the United States’ legal relationship with the Indian
tribes, there has been an acknowledgement of a vital sovereignty that, while
diminished, endures. The next Part examines some recent, ongoing assaults on the
longstanding doctrine of tribal sovereignty.
II. ASSAULTS ON TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
It is now axiomatic to say that modern Supreme Court jurisprudence has
evinced a skepticism of, if not hostility to, the doctrine of tribal sovereignty.94 The
Supreme Court has moved to curtail both criminal and civil jurisdiction, and to
diminish both regulatory and adjudicatory authority.95 But the assaults on tribal
sovereignty are not limited to the courts. The source and scope of tribal sovereign
powers over people and territory continue to be the subject of litigation, legislation,
and debate.96
There are several reasons motivating opponents of tribal sovereignty both in
litigation and legislation. First, there are those who fundamentally dispute the
legitimacy of tribes as governments with power over any nonmembers as a matter
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of legal principle and see attempts by tribes to exercise such power as illegitimate.97
There are also those who have concern that tribes may be incompetent in the exercise
of sovereign powers, or may operate in ways that are foreign to American legal
norms.98 Some have a fundamental mistrust or ignorance of tribal institutions.99 For
others, the decision to oppose tribal jurisdiction may be purely self-interested as a
litigation tactic working to delay litigation or seek a more favorable forum.100 As
more non-Indians live and work on tribal reservations, are employed by triballyowned businesses, and do business with tribes and tribal members, the scope of tribal
authority over people and territory becomes a more urgent question. Similarly, as
tribes continue to assert their rights to diminishing resources such as clean water and
healthy fish in an era of climate change, these disputes over the rights of tribes to
govern people and territory will continue.
The following sections offer a few brief examples of the ways in which the
courts, Congress, the executive branch, states, and private actors have sought to
undermine or limit the doctrine of tribal sovereignty.
A. Tribal Sovereignty in the Courts
Assaults on tribal sovereignty in the courts come primarily in the context of
challenges to tribal authority over non-Indians in the territories of the tribes. On one
hand, the Supreme Court routinely invokes its longstanding precedent that tribes are
“a good deal more than ‘private, voluntary organizations’”101 and that tribes are
domestic dependent nations whose sovereignty has been diminished, but never
extinguished.102 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has extinguished tribal
criminal jurisdiction and diminished both the civil regulatory and adjudicatory
authority of tribes.103 Tribal, private, and state litigants are left to argue about
particular assertions of tribal authority case by case. Despite the assertion that tribes
are more than private, voluntary associations, it is not clear to what degree, if at all,
the courts will uphold inherent tribal authority over non-Indians. Tribes have been
challenged even in the exercise of those rights that private organizations enjoy, such
as the right to determine citizenship or membership.104 Even were tribes analogous
97
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to private organizations, the rights exercised by voluntary organizations ought to
constitute the absolute floor for determining those powers retained by tribal
sovereigns, including the power to say who your members or citizens are.
Even in the cases where tribal interests prevail, the concurring and dissenting
opinions are ever more boldly dismissive of the doctrine of tribal sovereignty and
hint at a willingness to abandon the longstanding doctrine altogether.105 Justice
Thomas’ concurrence in Lara is but one voice in the dialogue regarding the future
of federal tribal relations and how (and by whom) that trajectory will be determined.
Tribal sovereignty skeptics cite the “ideology of legal centralism, and the overriding
institutional supremacy of the nation-state”106 as justification for minimizing the
powers of tribal sovereigns and limiting those powers to internal self-government
akin to private membership organizations.107 Reflecting this skepticism, Justice
Kennedy suggested in Lara that any inherent powers of tribes should be limited to
the relations among its own members, and suggested that recognizing a broader
governing authority, especially over non-Indians, would raise constitutional
concerns.108
In the recent case of Dollar General,109 regarding the scope of inherent civil
adjudicatory authority, the Supreme Court tied 4–4, thus affirming the Fifth Circuit’s
decision to uphold tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction over non-Indians operating on
trust land.110 The case involved a civil claim for an alleged sexual assault against a
tribal member by an employee of Dollar General, which operated on the Mississippi
Choctaw Reservation pursuant to an agreement with the Tribe.111 Dollar General
argued that as a nonmember of the Tribe, it should not be subject to civil jurisdiction
in tribal court.112 In the December 2015 oral argument for the case, Justice Kennedy
challenged tribal courts as “nonconstitutional entities” and suggested that they might
only have jurisdiction over non-Indians who expressly consent to such
jurisdiction.113 Advocates for the Mississippi Choctaw and the U.S. Solicitor
General repeatedly asserted that the claim to sovereign adjudicatory authority was
not conditioned upon express consent, primarily because tribal courts are the
instruments of tribal sovereigns rather than private dispute resolution entities—like
Indian Tribes’ Sovereign Power over Membership, 92 VA. L. REV. 793, 848–50 (2006).
105
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the American Arbitration Association.114 While questions and hypotheticals asked
during oral argument are certainly not authoritative, the exchange illustrates that
some jurists may view tribes as analogous to private, voluntary organizations with
power only over their own members, except where a party gives express consent to
tribal jurisdiction.115
In Evans v. Shoshone-Bannock Land Use Policy Commission,116 the Ninth
Circuit rejected the assertion of tribal civil regulatory authority over construction
within the reservation of the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall
Reservation.117 A non-Indian sought to build a single-family dwelling on non-Indian
owned fee land within the reservation.118 The Tribes asserted regulatory and
adjudicatory jurisdiction to enforce tribal regulation at the site because the Tribes
identified risks of groundwater contamination, improper disposal of construction
debris, and risks of fire associated with the construction project.119 The Ninth Circuit
found that because the risks identified by the tribe did not present “catastrophic
risks” to the health, safety, and welfare of the tribe, the tribe did not have jurisdiction
over the construction project or the dispute it engendered.120 Looking to Supreme
Court precedent, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Montana v. United States as requiring
a tribe to demonstrate a catastrophic threat to its existence or resources before tribal
jurisdiction may obtain authority over activities within the reservation involving
non-Indians on non-Indian owned fee land.121 In the case, the Tribes’ identification
of threats to groundwater and risk of fire were inadequately “existential” to satisfy
the court’s expansion of the Montana test for civil regulatory jurisdiction over nonIndians.122
While Dollar General presented an opportunity for the Supreme Court to
clarify the precedent upon which Evans and other decisions rest, the tie vote in the
Court leaves the circuits to continue to struggle with the scope of tribal jurisdiction.
B. Tribal Sovereignty in Congress
Congress has repeatedly affirmed its endorsement of the doctrine of inherent
tribal sovereignty in legislation pertaining to tribes.123 Still, many members of
Congress have expressed concerns and skepticism when weighing particular
applications of the doctrine.
This mistrust of tribal governing authority became most apparent during the
debate on the special domestic violence provisions for tribes enacted in the
114
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reauthorization of Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”).124 The special
domestic violence provisions recognized and affirmed the inherent tribal authority
to prosecute crimes of domestic violence committed by all persons, not just by
Indians, against members of a tribe.125 The tribes are required by the legislation to
assure due process and meet standards of tribal court operation prescribed by
Congress and the Department of Justice.126 Still, many members of Congress
adamantly opposed this affirmation of tribal authority. Senator Charles Grassley (RIA) and others in Congress expressed concern that tribal courts were not capable of
providing a fair trial to non-Indian defendants.127 In opposing the provisions
affirming inherent tribal jurisdiction, Senator Grassley took specific issue with the
mechanism of congressional affirmance of inherent tribal authority. Senator
Grassley said:
I believe in tribal self-government. But as we meet here today, there is no
inherent power of tribes to do anything of the sort the bill says. Selfgovernment is not government over “all persons”—including non-Indians.
Because tribes lack this power, it’s untrue to say that Congress can
recognize and affirm it.128
Congressional opposition to tribal jurisdiction arises in the context of Indian
gaming as well.129 Members of Congress advocate the interests of states and
localities, who frequently oppose the designation of tribal land as trust land because
trust land is lost to their tax rolls and because state and local control over the
activities on the land, particularly gaming, is diminished.130
On October 5, 2017, Senator Claire McCaskill introduced a “bill to abrogate
the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes as a defense in inter partes review of
patents.”131 The bill would exercise the plenary power of Congress to waive tribal
sovereign immunity when it expressly acts to do so.132 The introduction of the bill
124
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illustrates that Congress is aware of and interested in the exercise of tribal authority
and can, when it chooses, act to extinguish the exercise of tribal authority for federal
law purposes.
Because Congress can, and does, act in contravention of tribal authority, tribes
should be given the benefit of the doubt where Congress remains silent. In Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,133 the Supreme Court determined that the Indian Civil
Rights Act had not expressly waived tribal sovereign immunity from suit.134 The
Supreme Court held that Congress could waive tribal immunity as an exercise of its
plenary power, but Congress must do so expressly; tribal sovereign immunity may
not be waived by implication.135
C. Tribal Sovereignty in the Executive Branch
The policy of the United States articulated in both statute and in executive
orders is to promote tribal self-determination and to pursue a government-togovernment relationship between the federal government and the tribes.136 The
Departments of Interior, Health and Human Services, and Justice have taken steps
over the last several decades to acknowledge and honor the government-togovernment relationship and the tribal trust responsibility, with fluctuating degrees
of success depending on the inclinations and resource priorities of the White
House.137
However, there is a disparity between the general view of tribal selfdetermination that seems to animate the tribal relations of the Departments of
Interior, Health and Human Services, Justice, and other federal agencies, such as the
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), the IRS, and the Army Corps of
Engineers. As a result, respect for tribal sovereignty by the executive branch is a
mixed bag.
Beginning in 2004, the NLRB asserted jurisdiction pursuant to the National
Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) over tribes as employers for economic activities of
tribes on tribal lands.138 One recent example is the case of the Little River Band of
Ottawa Indians, which operates a casino on tribal trust land in Michigan.139 The tribe
133
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enacted an employment practices code which the NLRB determined violated the
NLRA provisions on collective bargaining.140 The tribe challenged the jurisdiction
of the NLRB as violating tribal sovereignty.141 The Sixth Circuit upheld the NLRB’s
jurisdiction and the Supreme Court recently denied the tribe’s petition for certiorari
review.142
Similarly, tribes and the IRS have engaged in a longstanding dispute about the
role of the IRS and the rights of tribes as sovereigns.143 In a statement to Congress
summarizing the dispute in 2012, the National Congress of American Indians
(“NCAI”) noted that in 2005, the IRS began an aggressive policy of auditing Indian
tribes and by 2012 had audited 77 percent of tribes in the lower forty-eight states,
and 100 percent of tribes with any significant revenue.144 NCAI argued that the
targeting of tribal governments for audit was discriminatory when compared to the
tribal audit rate to the much lower rate of audits of state and local governments.145
NCAI also outlined the ways the IRS had undermined tribal tax exempt bond efforts
and had targeted tribal health and education programs for scrutiny.146
Most recently, tribes opposing the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline
have charged the Army Corps of Engineers with disrespecting tribal treaty rights,
failing to adequately protect sensitive tribal cultural sites, refusing to ensure the
required federal consultation with tribes on projects that affect tribal interests, and
ignoring the significant concerns of the tribes regarding the Pipeline’s threat to tribal
water resources. 147
D. Tribal Sovereignty and the States
States have traditionally been viewed as hostile to tribal power.148 In some ways
states may view tribal jurisdiction as a challenge or diminishment of state
prerogatives or authority. As tribes and states have fostered cooperative
relationships and as tribes have asserted greater economic and political influence in
140
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their states and localities, many states have come to support and even defend tribal
sovereign authority.149 But there are still many examples of states whose legislatures
and executive officers raise significant challenges to tribal sovereignty and seek to
curtail the exercise of tribal power.
One striking example is the longstanding litigation between the Ute Indian
Tribe and the state and several counties of Utah.150 In the 1970s, the Ute Tribe
alleged that the state of Utah and local counties were “unlawfully trying to displace
tribal authority on tribal lands.”151 The Tenth Circuit’s most recent decision in the
case said a 1985 decision in the case should have ended the dispute but that “state
officials chose to disregard the binding effect of the Tenth Circuit decision in order
to attempt to relitigate the boundary dispute in a friendlier forum.”152 The State
proceeded to prosecute tribal members for conduct on tribal land, which the court
found “the State had no business doing.”153 In 2015, the Tenth Circuit instructed the
district court to preliminarily enjoin the prosecutions at issue in the case and to
dismiss the counties’ counterclaims against the tribe as violating the tribes’
immunity.154 The Tenth Circuit recounted the extensive record of the state’s and
counties’ hostilities to the jurisdiction and legitimacy of the Ute tribe.155 One
argument singled out for rebuke by the court was asserted by one of the local
counties involved: Wasatch County.156 Wasatch County argued that the “[t]ribe may
not exercise authority over any lands in Utah because (in part) the State was once ‘a
separate, independent nation, the State of Deseret’ . . . that didn’t recognize Indian
lands or tribal authority.”157 The Tenth Circuit dismissed this argument as ignoring
the United States Constitution and its grant of authority to the federal government in
Indian affairs.158
E. Tribal Sovereignty and Private Actors
Private litigants who find themselves subject to tribal jurisdiction almost
reflexively challenge the jurisdiction of the tribe, whether it be a tax, a civil suit, or
other regulation. In the context of tribal courts, federal common law requires
exhaustion of tribal court remedies before the federal courts will step in.159 At a
149
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minimum, this has meant that tribal courts must be permitted to address the question
of whether they have jurisdiction in the first instance, but it also leaves tribes
frequently litigating their own legitimacy as a forum.160
The Supreme Court’s recent per curiam, 4–4 decision in Dollar General
affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit upholding tribal civil jurisdiction over the
employer of the perpetrator of an alleged sexual assault against a tribal member in
the Dollar General store by a manager in the company.161 Dollar General contested
the civil jurisdiction of the Tribe’s court because it said the tribal court could not be
trusted to provide due process to nontribal members.162 Dollar General also argued
that civil adjudicatory jurisdiction could not obtain over non-Indian litigants without
the express consent of the non-Indian.163 Although Dollar General operated a store
on the Reservation pursuant to an agreement with the Tribe, and that agreement
included a provision that disputes should be resolved in tribal court, Dollar General
argued that the agreement did not constitute consent to a tort suit of the nature at
issue in the case, and was limited to disputes between Dollar General and the Tribe
arising from the agreement itself.164 The Fifth Circuit applied Supreme Court
precedent governing tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians to find that Dollar
General had, by doing business on tribal trust land pursuant to an economic
agreement with the Tribe, at least constructively consented to tribal court jurisdiction
over disputes involving the operation of the store.165
III. THE SOVEREIGN POWERS OF TRIBES
As outlined in the previous Parts, the tribal sovereignty doctrine in federal law
is a product of the rule of law by which the United States has asserted power over
the peoples and the territories of the nation. Tribes are not legal creations of the
United States and do not derive their sovereignty from the United States.166 Instead,
tribal sovereignty is aboriginal.167 But federal law recognizes and affirms the
exercise of domestic sovereignty by tribes within the international boundaries of the
United States.168 As such, federal law addresses itself to the question of which
(“[E]xamination [of jurisdiction] should be conducted in the first instance in the Tribal Court
itself.”).
160
Id.; see also Laurie Reynolds, “Jurisdiction” in Federal Indian Law: Confusion,
Contradiction, and Supreme Court Precedent, 27 N.M. L. REV. 359, 380 (1997) (“[T]he
exhaustion doctrine is frequently reduced to a meaningless exercise.”).
161
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162
See, e.g., Brief of Petitioners, supra note 9, at 20–23.
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Id. at 19–20.
164
Id. at 16–18.
165
Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 173–74
(5th Cir. 2014).
166
See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
167
Id. at 55.
168
See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014);
Steele, Breaking Faith, supra note 2, at 50; see also supra Part I.
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sovereign rights and powers the United States recognizes and affirms in tribes, and
which powers the United States asserts have been relinquished, divested, or
extinguished.169
This Part first examines the mechanisms in federal law for recognizing and
affirming—or extinguishing—the inherent sovereign powers of tribes as an exercise
of the Indian Affairs power, and second, discusses the categories of powers that form
the basis of inherent tribal sovereign power in federal Indian law.170 Part IV builds
upon this foundation to argue that the United States, as trustee for the tribes, has a
duty to enact legislation recognizing and affirming inherent tribal powers in federal
law rather than leaving this area of federal law to ad hoc judicial whims. Part IV also
identifies the principles that ought to guide Congress in this exercise of the Indian
Affairs power and in carrying out its trust responsibility to tribes and to Indian
people.
There is risk and perhaps folly in assembling any list of tribal powers.
Sovereign powers are not susceptible of tidy categorization. Any such discussion
will surely be both over- and under-inclusive. However, this Part articulates the ways
that inherent tribal powers have been manifest and affirmed in the federal legal
landscape so as to better examine where the law of tribal sovereignty must be
augmented and clarified.
In the case of Native American Church of North America v. Navajo Tribal
Council,171 the Tenth Circuit embraced the emerging principles and presumptions
about tribal sovereignty. The Court wrote:
[J]udicial decision on the nature of Indian tribal powers is marked by
adherence to three fundamental principles: (1) An Indian tribe possesses,
in the first instance, all the powers of any sovereign state. (2) Conquest
renders the tribe subject to legislative power of the United States
and . . . terminates the external powers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its
power to enter into treaties with foreign nations, but does not by itself
affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its powers of local selfgovernment. (3) These powers are subject to qualification by treaties and
by express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus expressly qualified,
full powers of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian tribes and in
their duly constituted organs of government.172
Against the background fundamental presumption that tribes have retained
aboriginal authority, there are specific governing powers that federal law has
identified as retained or divested.173 The mechanisms of federal law setting the metes
169

See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
Krasner, Pervasive Not Perverse, supra note 32, at 654.
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and bounds of tribal sovereignty include: treaties, in which tribes have both retained
and relinquished inherent rights; statutes, in which the United States has explicitly
recognized and affirmed the inherent sovereign powers of tribes; and judicial
decision, in which the courts have asserted a power to determine inherent tribal
powers have been implicitly divested.174 Tribes themselves also assert inherent
powers that have not been endorsed as principles of federal law, but that are
exercised by tribes in governing people and territory.175 The lack of certainty and
predictability for tribal powers that may be subject to divestiture by judicial fiat or
that may be exercised by tribes but perpetually challenged by litigants, suggest a
need for legislative intervention clarifying the federal law of tribal sovereignty.
In the case of the federally-recognized tribes, the United States has diminished
by degrees (and tribes have relinquished or been compelled to relinquish by treaty)
some control over aboriginal authority.176 Where tribes have not relinquished power
through treaty, Congress asserts a primary power—or even a plenary power—over
the boundaries of tribal sovereignty in federal law.177 Congress has broad power over
Indian affairs stemming from the Indian commerce clause of the Constitution, the
treaties and course of dealings between the United States and tribes.178 Courts have
not limited the exercise of congressional legislative power in the realm of Indian
affairs to the regulation of “commerce” but have acknowledged a broad and
exclusive federal authority to deal with and legislate regarding Indian tribes.179 Some
have suggested that the plenary power over Indian affairs is a “concomitant[] of
nationality” inherent in the sovereignty of an international nation-state.180
A central paradox of Federal Indian law is that Congress has asserted the Indian
Affairs power, which it deems to be plenary, to regulate tribes and justifies the
assertion of this broad power in part because it has taken upon itself a responsibility
as the trustee of tribes.181 In assuming such broad power, Congress has also been
charged with a fiduciary responsibility, or a relationship of trust, in dealing with the

of tribal government, determine membership, to legislate and tax, to administer justice, to
exclude from tribal territory, etc.); see also Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.
191, 212 (1978) (holding that tribes had been divested by implication of inherent power to
try non-Indians).
174
See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408, 435 (1989); see also COHEN, supra note 69, at 221–36.
175
See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 159 (1982) (discussing
efforts of tribe to tax mining activities and to exclude nonmembers from the territory).
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See COHEN, supra note 69, at 221–22.
177
See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004); see also Steele, Plenary Power,
supra note 1, at 702.
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Lara, 541 U.S. at 200–02.
179
Id. at 200. But see id. at 215 (Thomas, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the Court’s
analysis of the Indian Commerce Clause as a broad grant of legislative authority).
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Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977).
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See Steele, Plenary Power, supra note 1, at 670; see also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,
187 U.S. 553, 566–67 (1903).
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tribes. 182 As the Supreme Court held in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,183 the United States
has assumed a trust responsibility to and for Indian tribes, and with it broad
regulatory power over tribes.184 In other words, the Indian affairs power derives in
large part from the federal trust responsibility. This suggests that if the United States
abandons the trust responsibility, it will forfeit plenary power over tribes. To the
extent the federal government undertakes to manage the resources of tribes, it must
do so “for the benefit” of the tribes and is presumed, at least at law, to act in good
faith on behalf of the tribes.185 However, Congress has taken a broad and dangerous
view of what might constitute the best interests of tribes. During what is known as
the “Termination Era,” Congress sought to extinguish the legal relationship between
several tribes and the federal government, seeking to compel assimilation and uproot
tribal identity.186
Professor Richard H. Steinberg observes a distinction between “legal” and
“behavioral” sovereignty.187 Professor Steinberg argues that just because a sovereign
has legal authority does not mean that there are not external factors which may
constrain that authority.188 Steinberg writes, “[a]s Stephen Krasner and Robert
Jackson have each suggested, not all states are able to exercise all the rights
suggested by the legal definition, and some states are unable to exercise any of
them.”189 As in the international sovereignty context, tribes have domestic
sovereignty and governing authority, if not the full panoply of powers (or “control”
in Krasner’s parlance) of an international sovereign.
Without congressional clarification, courts wrestle with the attempt to
distinguish between those tribal powers that have been extinguished and those that
endure.190 They seek to make a distinction between tribal powers over external
relations and internal relations.191 The problem is figuring out what makes a power
external and what makes it internal. It is not clear which tribal powers fall into which
categories, or why for example, criminal jurisdiction (i.e., the power to administer
justice within a tribe’s territory) is an external power, or civil regulations (also within
tribal boundaries) might be characterized as governing external relations.192
182
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Still, some powers are clearly external: tribes may not enter treaties with
nations other than the United States, nor may they transfer interests in land to a
sovereign other than the United States.193 Tribes cannot legitimately enact a statute
that infringes on the sovereignty of the United States or of the states, by say,
purporting to regulate commerce, provide for the national defense, or offer courts of
general jurisdiction for matters not arising on the territory.194
The following sections outline the three umbrella categories of jurisdiction that
pertain to tribes as sovereigns: criminal jurisdiction, civil regulatory jurisdiction, and
civil adjudicatory jurisdiction.
A. Criminal Jurisdiction
While there is broad debate on the margins, Congress has “recognized and
affirmed” certain powers as the “inherent power[s] of Indian tribes” in statute.195
The power of Congress to recognize and affirm the inherent powers of Indian tribes
was upheld in Lara as a legitimate exercise of congressional authority under the
Indian commerce clause, the treaty clause, and the plenary power doctrine.196 These
textual and preconstitutional powers of the United States to deal with indigenous
people, collectively the Indian Affairs power, seems to be a “concomitant[] of
nationality.”197
One of the primary characteristics setting tribes apart as sovereign entities
clearly distinguishable from membership organizations is the power of criminal
prosecution.198 While membership organizations have the power to expel from
membership or perhaps, like HOAs, levy fines or encumber property interests, only
governments exercising criminal jurisdiction have the power to punish criminal
offenders by depriving them of their liberty after due process.199 Although the limits
of this tribal sovereign power continue to be widely debated, the fundamental
principle remains that tribes possess the power of criminal jurisdiction,
distinguishing tribes from voluntary organizations.200
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The United States has altered the bounds of tribal criminal jurisdiction in
numerous ways in the past. In 1953, as part of the prevailing policy of the United
States seeking to terminate the federal-tribal relationship, the United States enacted
statutes to remove criminal jurisdiction from tribes within the borders of six states:
California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, Wisconsin, and (upon statehood)
Alaska.201
In 1978, the Supreme Court held in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe202 that
all tribes had been implicitly divested of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians and
retained criminal jurisdiction only over their own tribal members.203 In 1990, the
Supreme Court in Duro v. Reina, extended the holding of Oliphant by stripping
tribes of criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.204 Congress amended the
Indian Civil Rights Act in response to the holding in Duro to clarify that tribal
criminal jurisdiction extends to all Indians, and is not limited to members of the tribe
exercising jurisdiction.205 This so-called “Duro fix” specifically recognized and
affirmed the inherent power of tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
Indians.206 Tribes do not exercise federal delegated power in enforcing criminal
laws, but rather, exercise their own inherent authority.207 This means, for example,
that prosecution of an individual for the same crime by a tribe and by the federal
government does not violate double jeopardy.208 In 2004, the Supreme Court upheld
the “Duro fix” in Lara, finding that Congress had the authority to adjust the
boundaries of inherent tribal power pursuant to the Indian affairs power and the
plenary power doctrine.209
While these pronouncements from Congress and the courts have altered the
boundaries of tribal criminal jurisdiction, moving the dimmer switch up and down,
none have supported a view that criminal jurisdiction is not a tribal power. Indeed,
there are very good reasons for upholding and enhancing the criminal jurisdiction of
tribes. Public safety and civic order require clear lines of responsibility and an
accountable governing authority to enforce duly passed laws.210 Tribes occupy and
govern territory, in some cases, very large areas.211 Some tribes have cooperative
relationships with states and localities for public safety and law enforcement.212
201
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As policymakers debate the appropriate boundaries of tribal criminal
jurisdiction, the theories of criminal jurisdiction outlined by Rollin Perkins may be
helpful.213 Perkins identifies four foundations of criminal jurisdiction: territorial
jurisdiction, Roman jurisdiction, injured forum, and cosmopolitan jurisdiction.214 He
writes that “[t]he territorial theory takes the position that criminal jurisdiction
depends upon the place of perpetration,” or in other words, the territory where the
crime takes place, determines the jurisdiction of the offense.215 Under the Roman
theory, it is the perpetrator instead of the place that determines jurisdiction.216 This
is the theory that appears to currently govern criminal jurisdiction in tribal territory
in the United States.
While the location of the crime is a crucial piece of the tribal criminal
jurisdictional puzzle, it is only part of the jurisdictional inquiry.217 If the perpetrator
is non-Indian, the tribe is deprived of criminal jurisdiction, with narrow exceptions,
under the current legal scheme.218
Tribes exercise criminal jurisdiction for crimes arising in Indian country
committed by an Indian, with some exceptions.219 The Indian Civil Rights Act
“recognize[s]” and “affirm[s]” the inherent sovereign power “to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over all Indians.”220 Congress affirmed inherent tribal criminal
jurisdiction over “all Indians” and the Supreme Court upheld the enactment of
Congress.221 Significantly, Congress chose to enact what is called the “Duro fix” by
recognizing and affirming the inherent criminal jurisdiction of tribes over all
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Indians, but left the Oliphant holding intact.222 The Duro fix, upheld by Lara, means
that Congress has the power to recognize and affirm inherent tribal jurisdiction, even
after the Court has ruled against such jurisdiction.223
Congress has not enacted an “Oliphant fix” per se but did modify the blanket
rule of Oliphant in conjunction with the reauthorization VAWA.224 In response to a
crisis of unprosecuted domestic violence by non-Indians against Indians on tribal
territory, Congress enacted the special domestic violence provisions codified at 25
U.S.C. § 1304.225 This legislation explicitly recognized and affirmed special
domestic violence criminal jurisdiction “over all persons” for participating tribes,
concurrent with the jurisdiction of the United States, of a state, or both.226
This expanded jurisdiction permits tribal institutions to offer appropriate
process to defendants while protecting the safety of the tribal community where
jurisdiction obtains.227 Where jurisdiction does not obtain over most crimes by nonIndians, tribes are left with uncertainty about whether offenders will face justice and
tribal communities are left largely unprotected.228
B. Civil Regulatory Jurisdiction
Tribes seek to exercise regulatory authority to enact conservation codes,
economic development and employment codes, housing codes, drug policies, taxes
and fees, and even speed limits.229 Because Congress has not addressed the matter,
courts have identified several inherent regulatory powers retained by tribes.230 The
regulatory powers include the power to: determine the form of tribal government,
determine membership, legislate and tax, administer justice, exclude persons from
tribal territory, and some degree of power over nontribal members on tribal territory.
Together these powers form a minimum contingent of inherent tribal regulatory
power. Courts have categorized these as the powers of internal governance.231
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But the scope of inherent tribal civil jurisdiction, both regulatory and
adjudicatory, is uncertain. Inherent tribal civil jurisdiction has not been addressed
by Congress and has been thoroughly muddled by the courts.232
Tribes have broad civil jurisdiction over their own members.233 The inherent
tribal authority to promulgate civil regulations in Indian country to protect tribal
resources, promote economic development, and provide for the health, education,
and welfare of people living in the territory is a vital tenet of tribal sovereignty.234
Tribes seek to manage scarce resources and interests in land and water.235 Tribal
regulatory authority can both promote economic development and protect the long
term conservation of tribal resources. The activities of all people on the tribal
territory, both Indian and non-Indian, implicate these priorities.
Whether tribes may exercise civil regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians is
more difficult. Tribal regulatory authority over non-Indians on non-Indian fee lands
seems to have been broadly extinguished in Montana and subsequent cases applying
it, with two exceptions: when non-Indian conduct threatens the health, safety, and
welfare of a tribe, or when the non-Indian has consensual relations and dealings with
a tribe sufficient to subject him or her to tribal jurisdiction.236 As illustrated by the
Dollar General case, courts seem to be casting around for principled applications of
the rule and as a result, confusion abounds.237 Tribes have some degree of regulatory
authority even over non-Indians within their territory.238 However, how much
jurisdiction and over whom is a question the cases do not answer with any clarity.
Scholars have criticized these exercises by courts as “riddled with doctrinal
inconsistency.”239 As discussed below in Part IV, it is vital that Congress clarify, in
close consultation with the tribes, the scope of civil regulatory authority.
C. Civil Adjudicatory Jurisdiction
The power to regulate is in many ways impotent without the power to enforce
regulations. Meaningful enforcement requires due process, and for most sovereigns,
that means an adjudicatory process. Federal courts that have considered the question
have held that inherent tribal adjudicatory authority over non-Indians extends no
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further than inherent regulatory authority, but have declined to say whether the two
are coextensive.240
Tribes have the power to set up courts and to outline the scope of that court’s
authority, to enforce tribal law and regulations, and to provide redress for injuries
arising on the tribal territory, just as every other governing authority.241 However,
tribal courts have been assailed by challenges from litigants, like Dollar General,
skeptical of the competence and independence of the tribal fora.242 Dollar General
argued that tribes are incompetent sovereigns for adjudicating tort disputes involving
non-Indians.243 No case demonstrates the need for legislative affirmation of the
inherent sovereign adjudicatory authority so clearly as Dollar General. A divided
eight-member Supreme Court underscores the division among jurists and
emphasizes the need for careful, principled policymaking consideration by the
legislature.
Part IV proposes the broad outlines and suggests guiding principles for such a
comprehensive legislative consideration of the metes and bounds of tribal sovereign
power in federal law.
IV. PROPOSED PRINCIPLES FOR A TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AFFIRMATION ACT
This Part seeks to provide a basic framework to launch a conversation among
tribal leaders, scholars, and policymakers regarding how to enhance the clarity of
the law of inherent sovereign tribal power. Such clarity would provide a more stable
landscape for tribes seeking to exercise that power, citizens subject to that power,
courts tasked with interpreting the law, and federal actors charged with carrying out
the federal trust responsibility. Tribes, courts, legislatures, states, and private actors
all face questions regarding the scope of tribal powers in many contexts. The plenary
power and political question doctrines as currently construed ought to compel
restraint from the courts in altering the boundaries of inherent tribal sovereignty.244
These doctrines also mean that as federal law now stands, the political branches are
empowered to shape federal law’s recognition or diminution of tribal authority and
that the judiciary ought to defer to the political branches.245
The inherent sovereign powers of tribes ought to only be diminished, if at all,
through the consent and participation of the tribes themselves rather than imposed
upon the tribes by the unilateral action of the United States. The United States and
240
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tribes could negotiate bilateral agreements, like treaties, ratified by both tribal and
federal sovereigns to agree to allocations of power over people and territory that are
particularized to the interests and capacities of the tribes. Such a process would
demonstrate respect for the basic dignity of tribal governments and provide a model
for addressing the human rights of indigenous peoples to be self-governing and to
provide for public safety within their territories.
While the prospect of bilateral negotiations may be unlikely, the tribes are
growing in political influence and participation.246 Congress has consulted with
tribes to enact several provisions recognizing and affirming inherent tribal
sovereignty.247 However, these have been too few and too narrow. The confusion
created by the courts demands clarification of this area of federal law by Congress.
There is a clear need for Congress to work in close consultation with tribes to enact
legislation to recognize and affirm the broad panoply of inherent tribal authority: a
broad Tribal Sovereignty Affirmation Act.
The following sections propose three foundational principles that ought to
guide the political branches in the exercise of this aspect of the Indian Affairs power.
First, tribal sovereignty affirmation legislation should expand upon the policy of
tribal self-determination that was initiated in the 1960s and has been a broad success.
Second, tribal sovereignty affirmation legislation should empower tribes within a
tripartite system through embracing principles of comity and full faith and credit.
Third, tribal sovereignty affirmation legislation should fulfill the federal trust
responsibility to Indian tribes by not only shoring up the legal foundation for tribal
sovereignty, but by providing adequate resources in fulfillment of treaty and trust
obligations. Finally, federal legislation recognizing specific inherent tribal powers
should provide respect and consideration for tribal legal and cultural traditions.
A. Building upon the Foundation of Tribal Self-Determination
Tribes created the Indian Self-Determination legislative agenda, enacted
beginning in the 1970s, which has proven to be a great tool of economic growth and
self-government.248 Although the federal commitment to adequately support these
programs with resources has been inconsistent, tribes have taken great strides even
with limited and inconsistent resources.249 The federal government has ample
evidence to deem the forty-year experiment in the principle of empowering tribes to
carry out governmental programs and services, stepping into the shoes of the federal
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government, a resounding success. An expansion of the doctrine of tribal selfgovernment finds ample support in the implementation of the self-determination and
self-government laws to date.250 But these laws are inadequate and ripe for
expansion.251
The current structure of the self-determination laws permits tribes to contract
or compact to carry out federal programs and services, and recognizes that tribes
very ably manage and leverage those resources. 252 But tribes are not mere
instrumentalities of federal trust and treaty obligations.253 Tribes must be recognized
and affirmed in the exercise of their inherent sovereign authority.
If sovereignty means anything, it is the power of self-governance. And
sovereign self-governance must include power to make and enforce laws binding
people within the sovereign’s territory.254 The next phase of tribal self-determination
and self-governance in federal law requires that the United States provide legislative
clarity recognizing and affirming that tribes have broad inherent powers to govern
their own people and territories. Tribes have been circumscribed in their ability to
regulate and adjudicate disputes in their territories, and in their economic
development, because litigants perpetually challenge assertions of tribal authority
and seek to use the courts to diminish tribal governance.
1. Congress Should Create an Express Presumption of Inherent Tribal
Sovereignty
When the Supreme Court created the doctrine of implicit divestiture, it opened
the door to a series of subjective, case-by-case inquiries into each exercise of tribal
power against a changing rubric of judicially-created standards.255 Both tribes and
their adversaries face deep uncertainty about which tests a court might employ or
which factors a court might weigh in considering whether a specific power has been
implicitly extinguished.256 A real “Oliphant fix” would not only affirm inherent
criminal jurisdiction, it would repeal the implicit divestiture doctrine and establish a
presumption of inherent jurisdiction where Congress has not acted to divest tribal
jurisdiction. Congress has repeatedly affirmed the doctrine of tribal sovereignty in
general terms and has specifically recognized and affirmed inherent authority in
particular situations.257
Congress should act to overrule the implicit divestiture doctrine by affirming a
presumption in favor of tribal jurisdiction where such power has not been expressly
extinguished. Courts have employed a presumption in favor of tribal authority where
250
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Congress has not expressly waived tribal sovereign immunity, for example, the
immunity is presumed to endure.258 Similarly, where Congress has not made its
intention to abrogate a treaty provision clear, courts are reluctant to find the treaty
abrogated by implication.259 But courts seem to depart from this pattern of
presumption where the scope of inherent tribal authority is at issue.260
Courts should employ a similar presumption in favor of inherent jurisdiction in
the absence of express evidence of Congress’ intent to divest tribes of a particular
power. Congress has the power to make the presumption express and to reclaim its
primary role to wield the Indian Affairs power and set federal Indian law and
policy.261 In the absence of such congressional clarification, where Congress has
been silent as to the exercise of tribal authority involved, the presumption should lie
with the tribe’s jurisdiction and the burden of proving that the power has been
extinguished should fall on the litigant challenging the tribal power.
Litigants challenging tribal power should be required to bring forth clear and
convincing evidence that a tribe’s power has been extinguished, rather than requiring
tribes to prove by reference to history, treaty, and custom that they have a power to
exercise jurisdiction. Because of the malleable standards of the implicit divestiture
inquiry, tribes are vulnerable to inexact judicial determinations finding their powers
impliedly divested by congressional silence.262
Congress should provide clear guidance to courts that when construing statutes
and treaties for the effect they have on tribal power, courts should require a clear
statement of congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereign authority, or presume
that Congress has not acted to extinguish the tribal power. Congress is capable of
extinguishing tribal powers that it finds incompatible with the exercise of federal
jurisdiction.263 The most recent proposal by Senator McCaskill to eliminate the
defense of tribal sovereign immunity in certain patent cases illustrates the
willingness of Congress to seek to expressly extinguish tribal powers when they
wish to do so.264
2. Congress Should Clarify the Montana Rule of Civil Regulatory Jurisdiction
Congress should bring clarity to the federal court-made tangle of the scope of
tribes’ civil regulatory authority over people and territory. Courts have been
inconsistent in their application of the rule announced in Montana265 that tribes had
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been implicitly divested of the power to regulate the activities of non-Indians on
non-Indian owned fee land within the reservation with two (narrow) exceptions. The
consensual relations exception and the threatening conduct exception.266 The Court
wrote in Montana:
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe
or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements. A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil
authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its
reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe.267
But as noted above, courts have had trouble finding circumstances that they
deem to meet the exceptions. Congress could spare tribes, litigants, and courts from
the perpetual search for judicially manageable standards in this area by recognizing
and affirming inherent regulatory authority over members and nonmembers within
tribal territory.
Tribes ought to be able to regulate all activities within the territorial boundaries
of their reservations.268 Regulations are ineffective if only implemented in piecemeal
fashion. The United States addresses many environmental and economic threats on
the national level to achieve important governmental objectives.269 Leaving tribes
with swaths of regulatory holes deprives tribes of the ability to meet their objectives
in providing for environmental and other regulation.
If Congress shares courts’ concerns about tribes regulating the activities of
nonmembers on non-Indian owned fee lands, Congress could set forth specific
legislative language offering notice to non-Indians living within the boundaries of
tribal territories of the reach of tribal authority. Congress could also establish
limitations on tribal regulatory authority over non-Indians that balance the need for
tribes to effectively protect, through regulation, non-Indian consensual relationships
with the tribe and its members and non-Indian threats and effects on the political
integrity, economic security, health, or welfare of the tribe.
B. Respecting Tribal Sovereigns in the Tripartite American System
Scholars have recognized that the American political system has long embraced
a kind of “trifederalism,” with sovereign powers residing and sometimes
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overlapping in each of the federal, state, and tribal governments.270 The United
States has acknowledged the sovereignty of tribes in express language in statute and
treaty, in court decision, and in its course of dealings with tribes.271 The United States
also relies upon tribes to provide for public safety in Indian country.272 But Congress
has not enacted a comprehensive statute to enshrine the status of tribes in ways that
adequately recognize the dignity of tribal sovereigns as partner governments in
federalism’s allocation of power. Tribal governments have key roles to play in public
safety in large swaths of the nation, in coordinated and comprehensive homeland
security concerns, in effective disaster response, and in resource management and
protection regimes.273
A Tribal Sovereignty Affirmation Act should set federal policy recognizing the
role of tribes as governing partners and remove the strictures that encumber tribes in
carrying out their public safety responsibilities. First, to enhance public safety for
all persons in Indian country, Congress should affirm the inherent criminal
jurisdiction of tribal governments over all persons within tribal territory. Second, to
enhance coordination and cooperation between federal, state, and tribal partners,
Congress should enact a policy of comity by recognizing and affirming tribal civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction for disputes arising in Indian country, and by ensuring
greater cooperation with tribes as coordinate governments in carrying out national
policy.
1. Congress Should Recognize and Affirm Inherent Criminal Jurisdiction
Tribes have great responsibility to protect public safety within their territory.274
These responsibilities often include law enforcement, first response to emergencies,
and enforcing tribal criminal law for Indian defendants and domestic violence
offenders.275 However, tribes operate at a significant disadvantage in carrying out
these responsibilities because of the complex jurisdictional framework.276 Since
Oliphant, tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in general, but
Congress has made some adjustments to the inherent criminal jurisdiction
270
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recognized and affirmed by statute.277 These adjustments include the recognition and
affirmation of inherent criminal jurisdiction over crimes of domestic violence
against tribal members in the 2013 reauthorization of VAWA.278 But these
adjustments have been sporadic and piecemeal, mostly in response to court decisions
rather than as part of a thoughtful federal Indian policy.
Congress should undertake a thoughtful policy recognizing and affirming much
broader inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction. As with each of the proposed provisions
of a Tribal Sovereignty Affirmation Act, Congress will have to make significant
policy choices, in consultation with tribes, to determine the scope of persons and
crimes subject to tribal criminal jurisdiction. Congress has acted to adjust the
boundaries of recognized tribal criminal jurisdiction before, not just in VAWA and
the “Duro fix,” but also in statutes like the Major Crimes Act279 and the Indian
Country Crimes Act.280 The Major Crimes Act, depriving tribes of criminal
jurisdiction over major crimes by Indians was upheld as an exercise of congressional
Indian affairs power.281 But the Major Crimes Act reflects an antiquated view of
tribal justice and the capacity of tribal governments. The lack of a cohesive policy
that incorporates the tremendous capacity of tribes serves neither the general
commitment to public safety nor the priorities of the tribes to act as effective
governments within their territories.
2. Congress Should Enact a Policy of Federal-Tribal Comity
In addition to public safety, tribes have responsibility for protecting homeland
security—even some borders—in cooperation with federal and state governments.282
Tribes also manage vast natural resources and contribute significantly to regional
economies.283 Congress should ensure the role of tribes as governing partners by
recognizing tribes as critical co-sovereigns. This recognition should require
meaningful consultation with tribes and opportunities for tribes to access resources
and exercise governing authority in concert with the relevant federal and state
authorities.
One aspect of this proposal would provide for full faith and credit for the
decisions of tribal courts, honoring tribal warrants and recognizing the judgments of
tribal courts. It may also take the form of codifying the common law tribal
exhaustion doctrine, requiring litigants to exhaust tribal remedies before appealing
277
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to federal courts (with a habeas corpus exception) and allowing the tribal courts to
pass upon their own jurisdiction in the first instance.
This comity should also codify the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine. As with
other sovereigns, tribes are immune from suit unless the tribe or Congress has
specifically waived immunity.284 This aspect of tribal sovereignty allows tribes to be
free from unwarranted harassment, but provides for the tribe to exercise
accountability through waiver and agreement.285 Tribes have subjected themselves
to accountability for torts and civil rights violations in accord with tribal customs
through tribal law or through negotiated agreements.286 While the power of tribal
sovereign immunity has been recognized in the courts, it has also been criticized as
being founded on “but a slender reed” of questionable precedent.287 Congress has
been deemed to have the power to waive tribal sovereign immunity, which implies
the power to affirm tribal sovereign immunity as well.288 Congress can remove this
question of federal Indian law and policy from the courts by setting forth a clear
statutory protection for the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. This would protect
economic development and demonstrate respect for tribal governments as competent
institutions capable of the responsible management of their immunity from suit.
C. Fulfill Treaty and Trust Obligations
The United States has taken upon itself solemn legal and moral obligations to
tribes both in treaty and in its course of dealings, giving rise to the federal-tribal trust
relationship.289 While this relationship has been characterized as like a guardian’s
relationship to his ward,290 the time has come to acknowledge tribes less as ward and
more as partner. The plenary power over Indian affairs has been asserted by the
federal government in many times in ways that are harmful to tribes. However,
Congress can and should use this broad power in combination with the trust
responsibility, to affirm tribal authority to exercise essential tribal powers and to
protect tribes from the judicial overreach that has diminished tribal jurisdiction.
The affirmation of tribal power alone, however, is incomplete. Tribes must
have access to adequate resources to carry out their sovereign responsibilities and
prerogatives. Some of those resources may come from an investment by the United
States in tribal economic development, in part through affirming the powers of
tribes. Other resources may come from the ongoing treaty obligations of the United
States for programs and services to Indian tribes.
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Another critical aspect of the trust responsibility of the federal government is
to ensure meaningful consultation with Indian tribes on projects and issues affecting
tribal interests.291 Congress should affirm tribes’ status as key stakeholders in
environmental, homeland security, public safety, energy, education, health, and
other national concerns and enact requirements for meaningful consultation with
tribes. As the recent Dakota Access Pipeline controversy demonstrated, current
tribal consultation requirements are inadequate and unenforceable.292 The United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, to which the United States
is a signatory, includes a right to consultation as a fundamental right of indigenous
nations.293
D. Respect Tribal Legal and Cultural Tradition
Finally, a Tribal Sovereignty Affirmation Act should not require tribes to
disavow tribal legal traditions, cultural norms, or customs to have sovereign powers
be recognized and affirmed by the United States. Just as the laws and justice systems
of the states vary in standards, statutes, consistency, and design, so tribal justice
systems need not mimic western systems to be just, legitimate, or to respect the rule
of law. The United States tolerates a wide variety in the laws and systems of the fifty
states, even lauding such variety as proof of democracy’s wisdom, experimenting in
laboratories.294
The recognition and affirmation of inherent tribal sovereignty should anticipate
and welcome the incorporation of tribal traditional principles of justice and due
process under the rule of law.
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CONCLUSION
Whatever the wisdom, extravagance, or folly of the plenary power doctrine’s
origins, federal law has long asserted a plenary power in Congress over Indian
Affairs. Federal law holds that with that tremendous power comes a significant
responsibility; a trust responsibility. Congress is the trustee obliged to act in the best
interests of the tribes. While plenary power has often been misused by the federal
government to impose unwanted policy upon tribes or to unilaterally abrogate
treaties, it has also been neglected when tribes have needed the protection that is
within the power of Congress to offer.
Courts have commandeered a policymaking role in setting the boundaries of
inherent tribal sovereignty. Tribes, as Red Jacket suggested, have been diminished,
bit by bit, through the creation of doctrines such as the implicit divestiture doctrine
or the application of unmanageable standards like the internal-external powers test.
Congress has too rarely exercised its power and its attendant duty to provide clear
guidance to the courts, tribes, citizens, and litigants about the scope of inherent
sovereign powers the United States will recognize. Congress has the power both to
limit and to affirm tribal sovereignty.
Rather than allowing courts or other political pressures to push tribes toward a
null or hollow sovereignty, Congress should exercise the broad Indian Affairs power
in close consultation with the tribes and guided by sound principles to recognize and
affirm meaningful tribal sovereign powers. Congress should help clarify the field by
enacting legislation to more fully codify the organizing principle of the core of tribal
sovereign powers: a future of self-governing tribal sovereigns as vibrant partners in
the tripartite American system of governance and justice.

